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1 .O INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This technical basis document was developed to support the tank farms documented safety 
analysis (DSA) and describes the risk binning process, the technical basis for assigning risk bins, 
and the controls selected for the mixing of incompatible materials representative accident and 
associated represented hazardous conditions. The purpose of the risk binning process is to 
determine the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and/or 
technical safety requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or 
represented hazardous conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. 
Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker 
hazardous conditions are considered for safety-significant SSCs andor TSR-level controls. (See 
RPP-14286, Facility Worker Technical Basis Document.) Determination of the need for 
safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for 
US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, as 
described below. 
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1.2.1 Representative Accident 
Routine tank farm operations include a number of material transfer activities such as waste 
transfers between tanks, incoming waste transfers from non-tank farm facilities (e.g., Plutonium 
Finishing Plant [PFP], 222-S Laboratory, T Plant), and bulk chemical additions to double-shell 
tanks (DST) and 100-series single-shell tanks (SST) for corrosion control or waste dissolution. 
When considering the related hazards within tank farms, it was postulated that the mixing of 
incompatible material in a waste tank could result in a chemical reaction that produces aerosols 
and enough internal pressure to expel headspace gases, vapors, and aerosolized waste. 
Incompatible materials that could potentially be transferred to tank farm facilities were studied to 
determine a bounding case. The scenarios that were considered were: 
Scenario 1. Addition of an incompatible material due to a waste transfer from an 
internal or external source: 
Case A. Misrouting or transfer of incompatible tank waste 
Case B. Incompatible waste addition from external source. 
Scenario 2. Inadvertent addition of an incompatible chemical due to a vendor or 
paperwork error when making a chemical addition to a tank: 
Case A. Addition of excess base to a waste tank 
Case B. Addition of acid to a waste tank waste. 
As the tank wastes are similar, reactions due to a transfer from one tank to another will not result 
in a significant release according to Reynolds (2001), “Potential for Tank Farm Systems to Give 
1 
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Off Toxic Chemicals or Pressurizing Due to Chemical Incompatibility." Reynolds (2001) was 
included as an appendix to RPP-9689, Offsite Radiological Consequence Calculation for the 
Bounding Mixing of Incompatible Materials Accident. Therefore, Case A of Scenario 1 was 
discarded as a potential bounding case. 
The majority of waste that is generated externally to tank farms would come from the PFP, the 
222-S Laboratory, and T Plant. Each of these facilities utilizes practices that ensure the final 
facility waste solution is not transferred to incompatible tank waste. In addition, the transfer 
lines are not compatible with strong acids (the most common incompatible material) and would 
fail before large volumes could be transferred. Therefore, Scenario 1, Case B was discarded as 
the bounding case. 
Inadvertent addition of chemicals was then examined. The addition of excess base to tank waste 
was examined for the potential to react and produce ammonia. Substantial amounts of ammonia 
are dissolved or trapped in some tank wastes. Ammonia is produced by the decomposition of 
nitrogen-containing compounds that were added to process solutions that eventually ended up as 
waste, Amine chelating agents such as ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid are among the chief 
sources. There is some potential for the ammonia in these wastes to be released into the vapor 
space of tanks and vented to the atmosphere. 
The solubility of ammonia increases with decreasing pH due to an increasing fraction of the 
dissolved ammonia existing as the ammonium ion. As pH is raised, the ammonium ion is 
converted to the neutral, molecular ammonia solute (aqueous "3). The neutral aqueous 
ammonia desorbs to become gaseous or vapor phase ammonia. The main reactions are as 
follows: 
The potential exists for strong bases to be accidentally added to waste tanks in amounts that may 
reduce the solubility of ammonia. A series of calculations were performed to predict the 
solubility of ammonia in a simulated waste and the effect of adding various amounts of 100% 
sodium hydroxide to the worst-case tank waste. It was found that a large amount of sodium 
hydroxide (slightly over 4 moledL of waste) must be added to reach the ammonia saturation 
point before any ammonia is released by the reaction. An estimate of the bounding ammonia 
release was calculated in WHC-SD-WM-CN-074, Chemical Reaction in a DCRTLeading to a 
Tonic Release. It was shown that the consequences of an ammonia release are well within 
conservative guidelines. Therefore, Scenario 2, Case A, was not selected as the representative 
case. 
Since direct chemical additions can be made to the waste tanks, an accident was postulated in 
which bulk delivery of an unexpected chemical is made to a waste tank (e.g., instead of the 
caustic addition expected, the delivery truck contains an acid). Since the delivery was assumed 
to be from a large tanker truck, only common chemicals that are routinely shipped in bulk 
quantities were considered. Common industrial acids were evaluated for their potential to react 
with tank waste resulting in gas or vapor generation. The reaction of strong acids with carbonate 
waste was found to produce large quantities of carbon dioxide. The reaction of acids with nitrite 
2 
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waste was also considered. It was postulated that the addition of acid could result in the release 
of nitrogen or an oxide of nitrogen. At basic conditions the production of one mole of nitrogen 
per two moles of H+ ions is possible, while at acidic conditions the production of one mole of 
nitrogen oxide per mole of H+ ions is possible. Thus, the reaction of acid with carbonate would 
be competing with the reaction of acid and nitrite as well as the neutralization reaction of acid 
with hydroxide. Experiments on the dissolution of waste with excess acid have been performed 
(Herting 2003, Final Report for Tank 241-C-106 Sludge Dissolution, Phase II). Waste from 
both SST 241-C-106 and DST 241-AY-102 was contacted with acid. DST 241-AY-102 waste 
contains similar quantities of nitrite and carbonate while SST 241-C-106 waste contains nearly 
40 times more carbonate than nitrite. Samples of the gases generated by the experiments were 
collected and analyzed. It was found that carbon dioxide was nearly the only gas produced with 
traces of hydrogen also being detected at concentrations three to four orders of magnitude less 
than the carbon dioxide (oxides of nitrogen were not detected). Since the production of carbon 
dioxide was shown to be the dominant factor, the production of carbon dioxide was selected as 
the representative accident. The addition of concentrated sulhric acid to the tank waste was 
identified as the bounding case and is presented here. 
1.2.2 Bounding Offsite Accident 
The mixing of incompatible materials accident is the bounding, low-energy atmospheric 
vapor/gas/aerosol release event, and has been quantitatively analyzed for comparison to the 
DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, “Evaluation Guideline,” of 25 rem. The bounding quantitative 
analysis for the mixing of incompatible materials accident is documented in RPP-9689, and 
shows that offsite radiological consequences are less than 1 rem. Therefore, no safety-class 
equipment or TSR-level controls need to be considered for offsite radiological exposures for any 
of the Iow-energy atmospheric vapor/gas/aerosol release events. It is important to note that 
DOE-STD-3009-94 does not provide any other evaluation guidelines (Le., evaluation guidelines 
are not provided for offsite toxicological, onsite radiological, and onsite toxicological 
exposures). These exposures were evaluated for the representative accident and associated 
hazardous conditions in accordance with the risk binning process described in Section 1.3. 
1.2.3 Associated Hazardous Conditions 
In addition to the hazardous condition that defines the representative accident, the current hazard 
evaluation database lists a number of hazardous conditions that are represented by the mixing of 
incompatible materials accident. The hazardous conditions typically involve chemical reactions 
caused by mixing incompatible materials and are postulated to occur in the various tanks (DSTs, 
SSTs, and double-contained receiver tanks [DCRT]). Also grouped under the mixing of 
incompatible materials representative accident are various types of conditions that result in the 
release of ammonia vapors. The ammonia release conditions were assigned to the mixing of 
incompatible materials accident because they most closely resembled the ammonia releases that 
were due to the inadvertent addition of excess base. Some type of waste disturbing activity is 
generally the cause of these ammonia release events. 
3 
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unlikelv unlikelv Unlikely Anticipated 
Beyond extremely Extremely 
1.3 RISK BINNING METHODOLOGY 
Direction on risk binning was provided by the US. Department of Energy, Office of River 
Protection (Klein and Schepens, 2003, “Replacement of Previous Guidance Provided by RL and 
OW”). Risk binning begins with a qualitative evaluation of the frequency and consequence o f  
the representative accident. Frequency is qualitatively estimated as “anticipated,” “unlikely,” 
“extremely unlikely,” or “beyond extremely unlikely.” Consequences are evaluated for the 
following receptors and exposures: offsite toxicological, onsite radiological, and onsite 
toxicological. These consequences are assigned to one of three categories: high, moderate, or 
low. Based on the frequency and consequence, risk bins (ranging from I to IV) are assigned. 
Tables 1-1 and 1-2 show the criteria for assigning the frequency and consequence levels, and the 
risk bins, which are assigned to the various combinations of frequency and consequence. After 
the risk binning process is completed for the representative accident, the process is then repeated 
for the represented hazardous conditions associated with the representative accident. 
In accordance with the control selection guidelines in Klein and Schepens (2003), Risk Bin I 
events require safety-significant SSCs or TSRs, and Risk Bin I1 events must consider 
safety-significant SSCs and TSRs. Risk Bin I11 events are generally protected by the safety 
management programs (SMP), and Risk Bin IV events do not require additional measures. 
Initial DSA development was largely Completed before Klein and Schepens 2003 was issued and 
more conservative control selection guidelines were used. During DSA development, safety 
SSCs and/or TSR-level controls were required for accidents or hazardous conditions that are 
assigned to Risk Bins I or 11, and are considered for accidents or hazardous conditions that are 
assigned to Risk Bin 111. For accidents or hazardous conditions assigned to Risk Bin IV, safety 
SSCs and TSR-level controls were not expected. SMPs were acceptable for addressing the 
residual risk posed by Risk Bin IV conditions. 
Table 1-1. Offsite (Toxicological Only) Risk Bins. 
Event freauencv 
I I I II I >ERPG-2 I TEEL-2 iHi& 
>ERPG-I I TEEL-I 
<ERPG-2 / TEEL-2 
(Moderatel 
< ERPG-1 / TEEL-1 
(LOW) 
Notes: 
fieparalion Guide for US .  Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, 
Change Notice No. 2, Appendix A, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington D.C. 
Radiological consequences for the offsite receptor are evaluated in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94,2002, I 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline. 
TEEL = Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
4 
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Anticipated 
Table 1-2. Onsite (100 m) Risk Bins. 
Event freauencv 
25tolOOrem 
>EERPG-2 I TEEL-2 
<EWG-3 1 TEEL-3 
(Moderate) 
125 rem 
CERF’G-2 I TEEL-2 
(Low) 
Beyond extremely Extremely 
unlikely unlikely 
Consequence category 
(radiological/ 
toxicological) 
Iv 111 
Iv IV 
>loo  rem 
>ERPG-3 / TEEL-3 
IHieh) 
111 
I l 1  
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline. 
TEEL = Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
EnvironmentaI consequences are also assigned during the risk binning process. There are four 
categories of environmental consequences (EO, El, E2, and E3, in order of increasing severity); 
these categories are defined in Table 1-3. 
Table 1-3. Environmental Consequence Categories. 
Category Definition 
I c ~ E3 
E2 
c Offsite discharge or discharge to groundwater t Localized discharge of hazardous material Significant discharge onsite 
EO 1 NO significant environmental consequence 
2.0 RISK BINNING RESULTS 
A risk binning team meeting was conducted on July 17,2002, to obtain consensus on the 
assignment of frequencies, consequences, and risk bins. The attendees represented a wide range 
of expertise in the areas of engineering, licensing, and operations, and included representatives 
fkom the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection. Appendix A lists the attendees 
and the organization each attendee represents. After the meeting, the risk binning results were 
distributed to the Technical Working Group (TWG) for review and concurrence. The final risk 
bin results, after comment resolution, are summarized in Tables 2-1 and 2-5. See RPP-19116, 
Proceedings of the Nuclear Working Group and the Technical Working Group. 
5 
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2.1 MIXING OF INCOMPATIBLE MATEMALS 
REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT WITHOUT 
CONTROLS 
2.1.1 Accident Scenario 
Large quantities of sodium hydroxide or sodium nitrite are added to DSTs, as necessary, to 
maintain the waste chemistry within the limits specified in the corrosion control program. These 
chemicals are delivered in tanker trucks and typically are added directly to the DST that requires 
chemical adjustment. 
In the accident scenario without controls, the wrong chemical is delivered and 5,000 gal of 
concentrated sulfuric acid is added to a DST or 1 00-series SST. The receiving tank is assumed 
to contain sufficient carbonate waste to completely react with the incoming acid. The carbon 
dioxide formed is released into the tank headspace carrying with it a fiaction of tank waste. It is 
assumed that the high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters fail, contributing to the 
consequences. Condensation of the aerosol on the walls of the tank was assumed to be 
insignificant. The reaction was conservatively considered to be instantaneous. Aerosolized 
waste is released as a result of the tank pressurization. 
2.1.2 Frequency Determination 
A frequency of “unlikely” was qualitatively assigned to the mixing of incompatible materials 
representative accident. The scenario requires that the chemical vendor also produce bulk 
quantities of sulfuric acid, mistakenly fills the delivery truck with the wrong chemical, places 
incorrect placarding on the vehicle, and includes incorrect delivery paperwork. The highly 
corrosive substance would have to be shipped to the receiving facility without being noticed by 
delivery personnel or shipping and receiving personnel. The vehicle would have to be connected 
and the corrosive material delivered without notice by participating personnel. In addition the 
receiving tank would have to contain high concentrations of carbonate waste. 
2.1.3 Consequence Determination 
This scenario of a bulk addition of acid to a waste tank has not been previously analyzed. To 
provide an estimate of the radiological and toxicological consequences, calculations were 
performed and are documented in Appendix B. The accident scenario, without controls, assumes 
that a cargo tanker filled with 5,000 gal of 98% sulfuric acid (18.7 M) is emptied into a waste 
tank instead of the chemical expected (e.g., caustic or sodium nitrite). The 5,000 gal assumption 
is conservative because the sulfuric acid would significantly exceed the weight that tanker trucks 
can transport. (While tanker trucks contain a nominal volume as large as 7,000 gal, they are 
limited by total weight of the filled tanker. Generally, the maximum weight that can be 
transported is 45,000 lb, which is the equivalent weight of 3,000 gal of sulfuric acid. The 
analysis conservatively assumes the tanker contains significantly more than the full weight 
capacity of sulfuric acid.) The rate of addition is conservatively assumed to be 175 gal/min 
based on RPP-14442, Calculation ofAcid Flow Rate into DSTs (typical addition rates seen in the 
6 
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field range from 75 to 100 gavmin). The receiving tank is assumed to contain sufficient 
carbonate waste to completely react With the incoming acid. The carbon dioxide formed is 
released into the tank headspace carrying with it a fraction of tank waste. It is assumed that the 
HEPA filters fail, contributing to the consequences. Condensation of the aerosol on the walls of 
the tank was assumed to be insignificant. The reaction was conservatively considered to be 
instantaneous. The contributors to the toxicological consequences are the HEPA filter release, 
the aerosolized waste, and sulfuric acid fumes. 
The source term used for the aerosol is 10% solids and 90% liquids. While the reaction will 
occur in the liquid phase, agitation will occur in the vicinity of the incoming acid stream. The 
agitation will cause some fine solids to be suspended in liquid. Solids that are dense or have 
large particle sizes will not be suspended by the bubbles. As the bubbles rise/collide/consolidate 
and collapse much of the solids will be released. The inclusion of 10% solids in the aerosol is 
considered a conservative assumption. The radiological unit-liter doses (ULD) were taken from 
RPP-5924, Radiological Source Termsfor Tank Farms Safety Analysis, and the toxicological 
sums of fractions (SOF) were taken from WP-8369, Chemical Source Terms for Tank Farms 
Safety Analyses. The bounding ULDs and SOFs for DSTs and 100-series SSTs were selected for 
use in the analysis. The atmospheric dispersion factors are fi-om RPP-13482, Atmospheric 
Dispersion Coefficients and RadiologicaNToxicological Exposure Methodology for Use in Tank 
Farms. 
Analysis assumptions and inputs are described beIow: 
b 
b 
b 
a 
b 
b 
b 
b 
5,000 gal addition (conservative as this volume would exceed the weight that tanker 
trucks can transport) 
175 gallmin rate of addition 
The acid is 98% sulfuric acid 
All the aerosol released is assumed to be respirable 
The ULD used for the aerosol in the analysis is 10% sludge and 90% liquids from the 
bounding DST or 100-series SST 
The SOF used for the aerosol in the analysis is 10% solids and 90% liquids fYom the 
bounding DST or 100-series SST 
The receiving tank is assumed to contain sufficient carbonate waste to completely react 
with the incoming acid 
The pressurization resulting from the accident fails the HEPA filters 
The inventory on the HEPA filters is equivalent to that which would produce a contact 
dose rate of 200 mrem/h 
Condensation of the aerosol on the walls of the tank was assumed to be insignificant 
7 
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Instantaneous reaction (conservative; would require instantaneous mixing). 
It is important to note that the key assumptions listed above were selected to maximize the 
calculated consequences of the inadvertent acid addition, and that it is the combination of 
conservative assumptions that drive the accident consequences. Each of the assumptions, the 
potential effect of changes in the assumption on the frequency or consequence bin (qualitatively 
judged), and the need to evaluate or protect the assumptions are detailed in Table 2-2. 
2.1.3.1 Assignment of Consequence Bins for the Onsite Radiological Receptor. 
Although the evaluation of consequences was intended to be qualitative, there were no previous 
analyses of an inadvertent large acid addition that could provide an additional frame of reference 
for the qualitative judgment. Therefore, the radiological consequences were estimated as shown 
in Appendix B. Also, while determining the offsite toxicological, onsite radiological, and onsite 
toxicological consequence bins, the meeting participants considered an actual operational 
experience where a transfer of unneutralized PUREX waste occurred. While the line between 
the valve pit and the distributor was damaged, there was no noticeable reaction with the tank 
waste (Occurrence #85-34 [RpP-13121, Historical Summaly of Occurrences from the Tank 
Farms Final Safety Analysis Report]). Table 2-3 compares the onsite radiological consequences 
of the bounding representative accident to the radiological risk evaluation guidelines. Since the 
bounding condition resulted in consequences that exceeded the moderate guideline to the onsite 
radiological receptor, the hazardous condition was assigned a consequence bin of “moderate” for 
the onsite radiological receptor. 
2.1.3.2 Assignment of Consequence Bins for the Onsite and Offsite Toxicological Receptor. 
As noted in the previous section, there were no previous analyses of an inadvertent large acid 
addition to influence the qualitative assignment of consequences. Thus, the toxicological 
consequences were also estimated as shown in Appendix B. Consequence bins were assigned 
based on the analysis presented in Appendix B and the occurrence discussed above. Table 2-4 
compares the toxicological consequences of the bounding representative accident to the risk 
evaluation guidelines. Reviewing the consequences shows that the offsite toxicological 
consequences are low, while the moderate onsite toxicological consequences are exceeded for 
the bounding condition. Since the bounding condition resulted in low consequences to the 
offsite toxicological receptor, the represented hazardous condition was assigned a consequence 
bin of “low” for the offsite toxicological receptor. A consequence bin of “moderate” was 
assigned to the onsite toxicological receptor based on the results of the analysis. It should be 
noted that “moderate” consequences can only be seen from bulk additions. Smaller drum-sized 
additions will result in significantly lower consequences. The rate of addition will be much 
lower than 175 gal/min. As drums are drained and the pump is transferred to other drums the 
addition rate is expected to average around 10 gal/min. Since toxicological consequences are 
based on the rate of release, the consequences will be proportionately lower. Also, if off-gassing 
is initiated it is not credible to assume that the facility workers will continue to replace the empty 
drums with full drums in the midst of a cloud of gas. Therefore, once off-gassing begins only 
one to two drums would be added before the facility worker would self-evacuate, thus 
terminating the addition. 
8 
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Moderate consequence High consequence 
guideline Calculated dose guideline 
(rem) (rem) (rem) 
Table 2-3. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences for the 
Mixing of Incompatible Materials Without Controls. 
Onsite Radiological Consequences 
Mixing of 
incompatible 
materials 
4.3 x 10’ 
Onsite 
2.5 x 10’ 
Offsite 
1.0 x lo2 
Case 
Mixing of 
materials 
incompatible 
Table 2-4. Summary of Toxicological Consequences for the Mixing of Incompatible Materials 
Without Controls. 
Moderate Moderate High consequence consequence consequence 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline 
1 1 1 
2.3 x IO” (ERPG-l) 8’6 lo-‘ (EWG-2) 9’2 lo-’ (ERPG.2) 
High consequence 4 
2.1.3.3 Assignment of Environmental Consequences. 
Based on operational experience and the conservative calculations in Appendix B it was 
concluded that there is potential for material release to either the atmosphere or ground. 
Therefore, an environmental consequence of E2 was assigned to the mixing of incompatible 
materials representative accident. 
2.1.3.4 Assignment of Risk Bins. 
Table 2-1 summarizes the frequency and risk bin assignments for the mixing of incompatible 
materials accident scenario without controls. The assignment of risk bins is derived from the 
consequences and estimated frequency of the accident. The risk bin for the offsite toxicological 
receptor is I11 because the consequence is “low” and the frequency is “unlikety.” The risk bin for 
the onsite toxicological receptor and the onsite radiological receptor is II since the consequence 
is “moderate” and the frequency is “unlikely.” 
16 
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2.2 MIXING OF INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS 
ASSOCIATED HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS 
There are more than 40 hazardous conditions represented by the mixing of incompatible 
materials representative accident. (Note that the specific number of hazardous conditions 
reported in the hazard evaluation database may increase or decrease in the future based on 
changes in field configurations or operations.) The results of the risk binning process for these 
hazardous conditions are shown in the hazard evaluation database under the representative 
accidents 03 and 23. Included in the hazard evaluation database entries is a basis for each 
consequence and ftequency. 
Meeting participants considered process knowledge, operational history, and the conservatisms 
in the analysis when assigning consequence and frequency bins to the other represented 
hazardous conditions. The results are summarized in Table 2-5, and are discussed below. 
Small inadvertent addition. Inadvertent additions from small containers, such as 55-gal 
drums, was assigned a frequency of “unlikely” for reasons similar to the bounding case. 
The consequences were judged to be low since the total volume of potentially reactive 
acid is small and the credible rate of addition was much lower than the bounding case. 
Tank waste mixing with tank waste conditions that result in energetic reactions. Tank 
waste mixing with tank waste conditions were judged to be “extremely unlikely” because 
process history and knowledge have shown that mixing different tank wastes does not 
result in an energetic reaction (Reynolds 2001). Even if a reaction were assumed to 
occur, it was judged that it would be significantly less than the bounding case of 
5,000 gal of concentrated sulfiuic acid. 
Incompatible waste transfer from external sources (€3 Plant, T Plant, 222-S Laboratory, 
and PFP). Waste transfers from B Plant were judged to be “beyond extremeIy unlikely” 
since it is physically disconnected from tank farms. Transfers from PFP, T Plant, and 
222-S Laboratory were judged to be “unlikely” due to the physical configuration and 
inventories of acids contained in the facilities. Even if a transfer was assumed to occur, it 
was judged to be significantly lower than the consequences of the bounding case of 
5,000 gal of concentrated sulfuric acid. 
Toxic gas (ammonia) release during intrusive activity. Toxic gas releases due to intrusive 
activities were assigned a frequency of anticipated based on the history of tank farms. 
The consequences were shown to be low in WHC-SD-WM-CN-074. 
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3.0 CONTROL SELECTION 
After the allocation of risk bins, a group was empanelled to select controls for the represented 
hazardous conditions. A multidisciplinary group representing organizations both internal and 
external to the Tank Farm Contractor performed the selection of controls. The list of control 
decision makers is listed in Appendix C. Controls were considered and selected to prevent or 
mitigate consequences of the hazards that were identified as requiring controls. 
3.1 PROPOSED CONTROLS FOR THE MIXING 
OF INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS 
REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT 
A summary of the representative accident, as well as a synopsis of the risk binning results, was 
presented to the control selection team. The group then proposed and discussed numerous 
potential mitigative and preventative controls for the representative accident. The possible 
mitigative controls proposed were: 
Headspace gadvent gas monitoring 
Self-evacuation training 
Limit the chemical addition rate 
HEPA filter efficiency controls 
Activated carbon filtration o f  ventilation exhaust 
Scrubbing of ventilation gases with watedcaustic solution 
Personal protective equipment 
Limited area access. 
Possible preventative controls were also considered: 
Perform a pH analysis to ensure compatibility 
Verify procurementldelivery paperwork prior to additions 
Use an evaluated suppliers list including periodic reviews/audits of chemical vendor 
quality control and assurance programs 
Control volume of additions 
Eliminate the need for liquid chemical additions 
19 
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3.2 SELECTED CONTROL FOR THE MIXING 
OF INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS 
REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT 
3.2.1 Control Selection 
The proposed controls were discussed and evaluated by the group. Control decision criteria are 
established in: 
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, “Nuclear Safety 
Management” (1 0 CFR 830) 
DOE-STD-3009-94 
DOE G 421 .l-2, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented Safety 
Analyses to Meet Subpart B of I O  CFR 830 
DOE G 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Safety Requirements 
Klein and Schepens (2003). 
The control decision preference can be summarized as follows: 
Preventive controls over mitigative 
Passive controls over active control 
Engineering controls over administrative controls 
Controls with the highest reliability 
Controls closest to the hazard 
Controls with the lowest implementation and maintenance costs. 
A consensus was reached based on the judgment of the participants to perform a pH analysis to 
ensure compatibility. This analysis is a reliable and effective preventive control. It is close to 
the hazard and can be implemented with minimal operational or budgetary impact. The other 
controls were eliminated because: 
Controlling the volume of the addition was considered unreliable and ineffective as a 
selected control. 
Monitoring the headspace gasivent gas or limiting the chemical addition rate are 
mitigative controls that are considered unreliable. 
HEPA filter efficiency controls are mitigative controls that are only effective for non- 
bounding conditions as the HEPA filter fails in the analyzed accident. 
Activated carbon filtration of ventilation exhaust or the scrubbing of ventilation gases 
with waterkaustic solution are mitigative controls that would require major plant 
modifications including additional safety analyses. 
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3.2.2 
Verification of procurement/delivery paperwork prior to additions and the use of an 
evaluated suppliers list, including periodic reviewdaudits of chemical vendor quality 
control and assurance programs, were not considered as effective as the selected control. 
Eliminating the need for liquid chemical additions would degrade the safe storage of 
waste by eliminating the current corrosion control program, and hinder the tank closure 
effort by eliminating many potential decontamination and decommissioning proposals. 
Self-evacuation training, limited area access, and personal protective equipment are 
effective controls for facility workers but were considered less effective for the onsite 
(100 m) worker. 
Format of the Selected Control 
Once the control was selected, options for how the control would be depicted were evaluated. 
The possibilities were: 
The control could be documented as a new standalone TSR administrative control (AC) 
The control could be a key element under a TSR AC @e., transfer controls) 
The control could be included in the SMPs: 
- Reflected as a bullet point in the SMP AC, specifying the key elements 
- Reflected as a bullet point in the SMP AC, with the details listed in the DSA 
- Listed in the DSA description of the SMP. 
After discussion, it was agreed to represent the preventative control as a standalone AC in the 
TSRs. A standalone AC most strongly links the basis and applicability of the control with the 
final disposition of the control. 
The precise wording ofthe control was then considered. The key areas of discussion were on the 
use of “field testing,” whether a specific pH should be defined, and whether SSTs, DCRTs, and 
catch tanks should be included in the applicability. The consensus resulted in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1. Summary of Technical Safety Requirement Controls for 
Mixing of Incompatible Material. 
Control 
Bulk Chemical Additions 
Perform field testing to verify that bulk 
chemicals sl-npped in tanker trucks have a pH 2 7 
before addition to DSTs, 100-series SSTs, 
DCRTs, and catch tanks. 
Safety Management Programs 
Measuring and test equipment program 
Safety function 
Prevents inadvertent additions 
of acids. 
Ensures program is maintained 
to control tank farm measuring 
and test equipment used to 
verify parameters to comply 
with TSRs. 
Comments 
Notes: 
DST = double-shell tank. 
DCRT = double-contained receiver tank. 
TSR = technical safety requirement. 
It was noted during the evaluation that: 
The AC bases should address the following: 
- The control does not apply to waste transfers; chemical delivery from drums 
(e.g., 55-gal drums) that connect to tank farm tanks or to waste transfer systems 
during chemical additions; or to additions of water or inhibited water. Inhibited water 
includes dilute concentrations of sodium hydroxide and sodium nitrite. 
- DSTs, DCRTs, 100-series SSTs and catch tanks are the only tank farm facilities 
where the addition of bulk chemicals from tank trucks is authorized (i.e., within the 
scope of the DSA). The addition of bulk chemicals to 200-series SSTs to support 
proposed retrieval methods would require additional safety analysis. 
- Clarification of the intent of “field testing.” “Field testing” is intended to mean a test 
by the Tank Farm Contractor after receipt of the shipment but before addition of the 
chemical. 
The specific method(s) of testing for pH (e.g., litmus paper) will be identified and 
controlled by a TSR AC program for instrumentation and measuring and test equipment. 
Any special requirements for the identified testing method(s) will be developed and 
documented for program implementation. 
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3.3 CONTROL ALLOCATION 
Of the conditions grouped under the mixing of incompatible materials accident scenario, a few 
conditions were identified as requiring controls due to onsite toxicological consequences of the 
inadvertent addition of acid. For these cases, the standalone AC was allocated. This new AC 
requires that the pH of bulk chemical additions be verified before transferring, thereby 
preventing the accident. Also allocated for these cases was a measuring and test equipment 
program that stipulates that any required instrumentation is properly calibrated or functionally 
tested. Defense-in-depth features were also identified for some of the represented conditions and 
are described in RPP- 14821, Technical Basis Document for Defense-In-Depth Features. 
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APPENDIX 3 
CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS FOR 
THE MIXING OF INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS 
B1.0 ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
The Mixing of Incompatible Materials accident scenario, without controls, assumes that a cargo 
tanker filled with 5,000 gal of concentrated sulfuric acid (18.7 M) is emptied into a double-shell 
tank (DST) or 100-series single-shell tank (SST) instead of the chemical expected (e.g., caustic 
or nitrite). The rate of addition is assumed to be 175 galimin based on RPP-14442, Calculation 
of Acid Flow Rate into DSTs. The receiving tank is assumed to contain sufficient carbonate 
waste to completely react with the incoming acid. The carbon dioxide formed is released into 
the tank headspace carrying with it a fraction of tank waste. It is assumed that the high- 
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters fail, contributing to the consequences. Condensation of 
the aerosol on the walls of the tank was assumed to be insignificant. The reaction was 
conservatively considered to be instantaneous. The contributors to the radiological consequences 
are the HEPA filter release and the aerosolized waste. 
B1.1 CONTRIBUTION OF AEROSOLIZED WASTE 
Sulfuric acid is a common industrial chemical. It is also typically transported at nearly 100% 
concentration (18.7 M) to reduce costs and lower its corrosion potential. The reaction of sulfuric 
acid with sodium carbonate is shown below: 
H2S04 + Na2C03 * COZ (gas) + Na~S04 + H20 . 
It can be seen that each mole of sulfuric acid would result in the generation of one mole of 
carbon dioxide. 
Calculating the total release of carbon dioxide: 
(5,000 gal) (3.785 L/gal) (18.7 g molesL) (44 g / g  mole) = 1.56 x lo7 grams carbon dioxide 
= 1.56 x lo4 kg carbon dioxide 
or: 
(5,000 gal) (3.785 L/gal) (18.7 g molesil) (24.5 L/g mole) = 8.67 x lo6 L carbon dioxide 
where: 
5,000 gal = assumed volume of sulfuric acid addition 
3.785 Ugal = conversion factor (CRCHandbook of Chemistry and Physics [Weast 
19811) 
18.7 g moledl 
44 g/g mole 
= molarity of concentrated 98% sulfiuic acid (Weast 1981) 
=molecular weight of carbon dioxide (Weast 1981) 
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24.5 Wg mole = the volume of carbon dioxide gas at 25 "C (298 K) 
= (22.4 Wg mole at 273K) (298 W273 K). 
The volume of aerosol carried off by the waste can be estimated using an entrainment coefficient 
E: 
E = Volume aerosoWolume gas through the surface 
At low superficial gas velocities discrete bubbles rise through the pool uniformly and steadily. 
This flow pattern is classified as the bubbly flow regime. When superficial gas velocity exceeds 
the threshold value (jg,J the flow regime transitions from bubbly flow to chum turbulent flow 
which is characterized by nonuniform bubbles rising in a more random manner. The transitional 
superficial velocity can be found in RPP-9689, Offsite Radiological Consequence Calculation 
for the Bounding Mixing of Incompatible Materials Accident: 
jg,t = 0.3 [(~g)/(pf)]*'~ = 4.8 x m/s 
where: 
u is the liquid surface tension, 0.072 kg/s2 for water against air at 25 "C (Weast 1981) 
g is the gravitational constant, 9.81 m/s2 
pf is the assumed liquid density, 1.1 x lo3 kg/m3. 
The superficial velocity (ig) for carbon dioxide generation can be calculated: 
j, = [(9.1 kgk) / (1.8 kg/m3)] [(9.2 rn) / (3.79 x lo3 m3)] = 1.2 x 10.' m/s 
where: 
9.1 kg/s 
9.2 m 
3.79 x lo3 m3 = waste volume [I,OOO,OOO gal assumed volume] 
1.8 kg/m3 
= the carbon dioxide generation rate 
= (1.56 x lo4 kg COz) / [ ((5,000 gal) / (175 gavmin)} (60 s/min)] 
= depth of waste in tank [a full tank is assumed] 
= density of gas at 25 "C [(44.01 kgkg mole) / (24.5 m3kg mole). 
Since the superficial velocity is less than the threshold velocity, the applicable flow regime is 
bubbly flow. 
The radiological source term used for the aerosol in this analysis is 10% DST sludge and 90% 
DST supernatant. (The bounding DST radiological source term also bounds the radiological 
source term of the 100-series SSTs.) Gas generation will occur in the vicinity of the incoming 
acid stream. The agitation caused by the gas generation will not cause the solid waste to be 
thoroughly mixed with the liquid. In addition, the solids will settle out as they pass through the 
liquid phase toward the surface. The inclusion of 10% solids in the aerosol i s  a conservative 
assumption. The radiological unit-liter dose (ULD) for the waste is from WP-5924, 
Radiological Source Term for Tank Farms Safety Analysis. 
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The waste aerosolized is calculated as follows: 
(8.67 x lo6 L) (2.3 x = 2.0 L 
where: 
2.3 x lo-’ =bounding entrainment coefficient for CaC03 suspension in water (RPP-9689) 
Given 
ULD for DST liquids = 1 .O x lo3 Sv/L (RPP-5924) 
ULD for DST sludge = 1.9 x lo5 Sv/L (RPP-5924) 
ULD for aerosol = [(LO io3 S ~ L )  (0.911 + [(i.9 io5 S ~ / L )  (0.1)~ 
= 1.99 io4 sV&. 
Onsite aerosol dose = (aerosol released) (onsite xlQ) (onsite ULD) (breathing rate) 
Onsite Daerosol = (2.0 L) (0.0328 s/m3) (1.99 x lo4 SvL) (3.33 x m3k) 
= 4.3 x lo-‘ s v  
where: 
0.0328 s/m3 = onsite x/Q (RPP-13482, Atmospheric Dispersion Coefticients and 
Radiological/Toxicological Exposure Methodology for Use in Tank 
Fams) 
3.33 x 10 m Is  = breathing rate (RPP-5924). 4 3  
B1.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE HIGH-EFFICIENCY PARTICULATE AIR FILTER 
Since a significant quantity of carbon dioxide is released, it is assumed that the tank pressurizes 
sufiiciently to fail the HEPA filters. 
Bounding HEPA filter dose due to overpressure = 4.0 x 10” Sv (RPP-13437, Technical 
Basis Document for Ventilation System 
Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered 
Release). 
B1.3 TANK PRESSURIZATION 
It can be seen that the production of carbon dioxide reaches a significant volume. It was 
postulated that the rate of gas production would be sufficient to challenge the 55 to 60 lb/in2 
gauge failure pressure for DSTs or the 11 to 12 lb/in2 gauge failure pressure for SSTs 
(WHC-SD-TWR-RPT-003, DELPHI Expert Panel Evaluation of Hanford High Level Waste 
Tank Failure Modes and Release Quantities). 
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The rate of production can be found by: 
(175 gal/min) (3.785 Ugal) (lmid60 s) (18.7 g moles/L) (24.5 L/g mole) = 5.06 x lo3 L/s 
= 5.06 m3/s 
where: 
175 gaVmin =rate of suI€uric acid addition (RPP-14442) 
3.785 L/gal = conversion factor (Weast 1981) 
18.7 g moledl =molarity of concentrated 98% sulfuric acid (Weast 1981) 
44 gig mole = molecular weight of carbon dioxide (Weast 1981) 
24.5 IJg mole = the volume of carbon dioxide gas at 1 atm (14.7 lb/in2 absolute) and 
= (22.4 L/g mole at 273 K) (298 W273 K). 
25 O C  (298 K) 
Tank pressurization as a function of gas flowrate was calculated in HNF-4240, Organic Solvent 
Topical Report, When all the vents were considered it was found that it would take a flowrate of 
nearly 14 m3/s to pressurize a tank to 14 lb/in2 gauge (28.7 lb/in2 absolute). The number and 
geometry of vent paths vary from tank to tank; however, the tank presented in HNF-4240, used 
for the vent path calculation (241-C-103), is representative of all SSTs. For all SSTs, tank farm 
Engineering has judged the gas production rate is still bounded by the ventilation capacity at 
11 lblin’ gauge (conservatively estimated SST tank pressure [WHC-SD-TWR-RpT-O03]). In 
order to compare volumetric ffowrates of gaseous materials, they need to be adjusted to the Same 
reference pressure. Converting the 14 m3/s flowrate at 28.7 lb/in* absolute pressure to a pressure 
of 14.7 Ib/in2 absolute (1  atm) results in a flowrate of 27 m3/s. Thus, it can be seen that the 
production rate of carbon dioxide is less than a fifth of what is required to pressurize the tank to 
14 Ib/in2 gauge. The flowrate of carbon dioxide is estimated to pressurize the tank to 2.6 lb/in2 
gauge. Therefore, any additional release due to tank failure is not considered credible. 
B1.4 OVERALL ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
Total onsite radiological consequences = (aerosol contribution) + (WEPA contribution) 
Onsite D T ~ ~ ~  = (4.3 x lo-’ Sv) + (4.0 x lo5 Sv) = 4.3 x 10’ Sv 
= 4.3 x IO” rem. 
B2.0 TOXICOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
The Mixing of Incompatible Materials accident scenario, without controls, assumes that a cargo 
tanker filled with 5,000 gal of concentrated sulfuric acid (18.7 M) is emptied into a DST or 
100-series SST, instead of the chemical expected (e.g., caustic or nitrite). The rate of addition is 
assumed to be 175 gal/mifi, which is considered to be a reasonably conservative flow rate 
(FU’P-14442). The receiving tank is assumed to contain sufficient carbonate waste to completely 
react with the incoming acid. The carbon dioxide formed is released into the tank headspace 
carrying with it a fraction of tank waste. It is assumed that the HEPA filters fail, contributing to 
B-4 
Page 44 of 63 of DA02545880 
RPP- 12646 REV 4 
the consequences. Condensation of the aerosol on the walls of the tank was assumed to be 
insignificant. The reaction was conservatively considered to be instantaneous. The contributors 
to the toxicological consequences are the HEPA filter release, the aerosolized waste, and sulfuric 
acid fumes. 
B2.1 CONTRIBUTION FROM AEROSOLIZED WASTE 
Sulfuric acid is a common industrial chemical. It is also typically transported at nearly 100% 
concentration (1 8.7 MJ to reduce costs and lower its corrosion potential. The reaction of sulfuric 
acid with sodium carbonate is shown below: 
H2S04 + Na2CO3 + CO2 (gas) + Na2S04 + H20 . 
It can be seen that each mole of sulfuric acid would result in the generation of one mole of 
carbon dioxide. 
Calculating the rate of release of carbon dioxide: 
(175 gal/min) (3.785 L/gal) (1 mid60 s) (18.7 g moles/L) (44 g/g mole) = 9.08 x lo3 g/s 
(175 galirnin) (3.785 L/gal) (1 mid60 s) (18.7 g moles/L) (24.5 Wg mole) = 5.06 x lo3 Us 
where: 
175 gaVmin 
3.785 Ygal 
18.7 g moles/L 
44 g/g mole 
24.5 Wg mole 
= rate of sulfuric acid addition (RPP-14442) 
= conversion factor (Weast 1981) 
= molarity of concentrated 98% sulfuric acid (Weast 1981) 
= molecular weight of carbon dioxide (Weast 1981) 
= the volume of carbon dioxide gas at 25 "C (298 IC) 
= (22.4 Wg mole at 273 K) (298 W273 K). 
The toxicological source tern used for the aerosol in this analysis is 10% solids and 90% liquids 
from the bounding DST or 100-series SST. Gas generation will occur in the vicinity of the 
incoming acid stream. The agitation caused by the gas generation will not cause the solid waste 
to be thoroughly mixed with the liquid. In addition, the solids will settle out as they pass through 
the liquid phase toward the surface. The inclusion of 10% solids in the aerosol is a conservative 
assumption. The toxicological sums of fractions (SOF) for the waste are from RPP-8369, 
Chemical Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analyses. 
Since the superficial velocity is less than the threshold velocity, the applicable flow regime is 
bubbly flow (as shown above). 
The waste aerosolized is calculated as follows: 
(5.06 x IO3 Us) (2.3 x lo') = 1.16 x lo5 Us 
= 1 . 1 6 ~  104m3/s. 
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where: 
2.3 x lo-' =bounding entrainment coefficient for CaC03 suspension in water (RPP-9689) 
B2.1.1 Onsite Contribution of Aerosolized Waste 
Given 
Onsite, high consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST liquids 
Onsite, high consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST solids 
Onsite aerosol, high consequence SOF multiplier = [(1.27 x lo7) (0.9)] + r(9.80 x lo7) (O.l)] 
= 1.27 x lo7 (WP-8369) 
= 9.80 x lo7 (RPP-8369) 
= 2.12 10'. 
And 
Onsite, moderate consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST liquids 
Onsite, moderate consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST solids 
= 5.73 x 10' (RPP-8369) 
= 7.77 x lo* (RPP-8369) 
Onsite aerosol, moderate consequence SOF multiplier = [(5.73 x 10') (0.9)] + [(7.77 x IO8) (0.1)] 
= 5.93 x lo8. 
Onsite aerosol SOF = (aerosol release rate) (onsite SOF multiplier) (onsite x/Q) 
6 3  Onsite, high consequence SOF,,,,I = (1.16 x 10- m /s) (2.12 x lo7) (0.0328 s/m3) 
= 8.1 x 10' 
Onsite, moderate consequence SOFaerosol = (1.16 x 10-6m3/s) (5.93 x lo8) (0.0328 s/m3) 
= 2.3 x 10'" 
where: 
0.0328 s/m3 = onsite xlQ (RPP-13482). 
B2.1.2 Offsite Contribution of Aerosolized Waste 
Given 
Offsite, high consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST liquids 
Offsite, high consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST solids 
= 5.73 x IO' (RPP-8369) 
= 7.77 x lo8 (RPP-8369) 
Offsite aerosol, high consequence SOF multiplier = [(5.73 x lo8) (0.9)] + [(7.77 x 10') (O.l)] 
= 5.93 x lo8. 
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And 
Offsite, moderate consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST liquids 
Offsite, moderate consequence SOF multiplier for bounding DST or 100-series SST solids 
= 3.71 x lo9 (RPP-8369) 
= 2.21 x lo’ (RPP-8369) 
Offsite aerosol, moderate consequence SOF multiplier 
= [(3.71 x lo9) (0.9)] f [(2.21 x IO9) (O.l)] 
= 3.56 io9. 
Offsite aerosol SOF = (aerosol release rate) (offsite SOF multiplier) (offsite x/Q) 
Offsite, high consequence SOFaeroso, = (1.16 x 10-6m3/s) (5.93 x lo8) (2.22 x 10” s/m3) 
= 1.5 x lo-’ 
Offsite, moderate consequence SOFaerosol = (1.16 x m3/s) (3.56 x lo9) (2.22 x 10” s/m3) 
= 9.2 x lo-’ 
where: 
2.22 x 10” s/m3 = offsite x/Q OIpP-13482). 
B2.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE HIGH-EFFICIENCY PARTICULATE AIR FILTER 
Since the steam volume exceeds the headspace volume, it is assumed that the tank pressurizes 
sufficiently to fail the HEPA filters. 
Onsite, bounding filter release SOFHE~A = 5.2 x 10” (WP-13437). 
Offsite, bounding filter release SOEHEPA =7.3 x 10‘’ (WP-13437). 
Since only moderate consequence SOFs were calculated in RPP-13437 for the release from a 
HEPA filter, these contributions will also be conservatively applied to the high consequence 
calculations despite over representing the contribution from the HEPA release by nearly an order 
of magnitude. 
B2.3 CONTRIBUTION FROM THE SULFURIC ACID FUMES 
The addition of sulfuric acid to the tank would also result in some quantity of sulfuric acid being 
present in the gas as it exits from the tank. The quantity can be estimated from the partial 
pressure of sulfuric acid at the conditions encountered. 
Mass sulfuric acid= (5,000 gal) (3.785 Ugal) (1.86 kf l )  = 3.52 x IO4 kg 
Mass tank waste = (50,000 gal) (3.785 L/gal) (1.1 kg/L) = 2.08 x lo5 kg 
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Weight percent sulfuric acid = [(3.52 x IO4 kg) / (3.52 x IO4 kg + 2.08 x lo5 kg)] x 100 = 14.5 
where: 
50,000 gal = conservatively assumed waste volume 
1.1 kg/L = assumed density of the waste 
1.86 kg/L = density of suIfuric acid (Weast 1981). 
The vapor pressures of sulfuric acid and aqueous waste (water) at a conservative 20% sulfuric 
acid and 120 "C can be found. 
Partial pressure of sulfuric acid = 4.32 x 1 0-l2 bar (Perry's Chemical Engineers ' 
= 4.26 x lo-' Atm 
Handbook Perry 19841) I 
The total amount of sulfuric acid leaving the tank as vapor can then be found as a volumetric 
proportion of the total release. 
[(9.08 x 1 O3 g/s)/(44 g/g mole COz)] E(4.26 x lo-'' Am)/( 1 Atm)] 
= 8.8 x 10" g mole/s sulfuric acid vapors 
Converting from gram moles to grams: 
(8.8 x lo-'' gmole/s) (98 g/gmole) = 8.6 x g/s 
B2.3.1 Onsite Contribution of Sulfuric Acid 
Onsite sulfuric SOF = (sulfuric acid release rate) (onsite x/Q) / (sulfinic acid temporary 
Onsite, high consequence SOFs,lf,~c = (8.6 x 10' gk) (0.0328 s/m3) / (3.0 x 10" g/m3) 
emergency exposure limit [TEEL]) 
= 9.4 x lo8 
Onsite, moderate consequence SOFsu~~u~c = (8.6 x 10" g/s) (0.0328 s/m3) / (1 .Ox lo-' g/m3) 
= 2.8 10.' 
where: 
0.0328 s/m3 
3.0 x l o 2  g/m3 
1 .O x lo-' g/m3 
= onsite xlQ (RPP-13482) 
= sulfuric acid TEEL-3 (DKC-05-0002, AEGIS, ERPGs, or Rev. 21 
TEELS for Chemicals of Concern 2005) 
= sulfiuic acid TEEL-2 (DKC-05-0002). 
B2.3.2 Offsite Contribution of Sulfuric Acid 
Offsite sulfuric SOF = (sulfuric acid release rate) (offsite x/Q) I (sulfuric acid TEEL) 
Offsite, high consequence SOF,~fulic = (8.6 x lo-' g/s) (2.22 x s/m3) / (1.0 x g/m3) 
= 1.9x 
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Offsite, moderate consequence SOFsulfuic = (8.6 x gk) (2.22 x loa5 s/m3) / (2.0 x g/m3) 
= 9.5 x 10-'O 
where: 
2.22 x s/m3 = offsite XlQ (RPP-13482) 
1 .O x lo-* p/m3 = sulfuric acid TEEL-2 (DKC-05-0002) 
2.0 x p/m3 = sulfuric acid TEEL-1 (DKC-05-0002). 
B2.4 OVERALL TOXICOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
B2.4.1. Total Onsite Toxicological Consequences 
Total onsite toxicological consequences = (aerosol contribution) + WEPA contribution) + 
(sulfuric acid contribution) 
Onsite, high consequence  SOFT,^^ = (8.1 x 10.') + (5.2 x 
= 8.6 x 10" 
+ (9.4 x lo-') 
Onsite, moderate consequence  SOFT^^^^ = (2.3 x 10") + (5.2 x IO-') + (2.8 x 
= 2.3 x 10" 
B2.4.2 Total Offsite Toxicological Consequences 
Total offsite toxicological consequences = (aerosol contribution) + (HEPA contribution) 
+ (sulfuric acid contribution) 
Offsite, high consequence  SOFT^^^ = (1.5 x 10.') + (7.3 x 
= 1.5 x 
+ (1.9 x 10") 
Offsite, moderate consequence  SOFT^^^ = (9.2 x lo-') + (7.3 x + (9.5 x IO-") 
= 9.2 x 
B3.0 RESULTS 
Tables B3-1 and B3-2 compare the accident consequences with the risk evaluation guidelines. 
Reviewing the consequences shows that the mixing of incompatible materials accident is above 
the onsite moderate radiological guidelines. Offsite toxicological consequences are below the 
guidelines. However, the toxicological release exceeds the onsite moderate toxicological 
guidelines. 
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High consequence 
guideline 
(rem) 
Table B3- 1. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Mixing of Incompatible Materials. 
Mixing of incompatible materials 4.3 x lo+' 2.5 x 10'' 
Case 
1.ox lO+Z 
Onsite Radiological Consequences 
Onsite Offsite 
Moderate 
consequence 
SOF Guideline 
2.3 x 10" 1 
Mixing of 
incompatible 
Note: 
Moderate High consequence consequence High consequence 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline 
8.6 x 10.' 1 9.2 x 1 1.5 x 10-2 1 
I 
SOF = sum of fractions. 
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13. Spreadsheet results and all hand calculations were verified. 
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understand the analysis without requiring outside information. (ORP QAPP 
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